I rediscovered an analysis I wrote about the EU sanctions against the Russian Federation one year ago. The topic is still actual and could be of an interest to my foreign-politics keen audience.
Ecco ci qua:
Sanctions of the EU against the Russian Federation
Sanctions have for long been an instrument of peaceful settlement of disputes. It can be differentiated between disputes over facts or disputes over law.
In the case of Crimea and Donbass, we can observe a conflict over the question, if the annexation was lawful. Whereas the European Union insists on the principle of uti possidetis and Ukrainian sovereignty, the Russian Federation arguments with the self determination of people and perceived historical injustice.
The referendum and later incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation caused the EU and other nations to introduce various types of sanctions. The measures introduced in March 2014 through the so called “Smart Sanctions” include the freezing of assets for individuals and specific entities, restrictions on financial transactions with Russian firms, embargo on dual-use technology, special equipment for Arctic oil drilling. They later triggered countersanctions targeting particularly the export of European agrarian products to Russia.
The EU and other allies such as most notably the US began imposing economic sanctions on Russia after the government signed a treaty incorporating Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation in March 2014. They later increased measures to protest Russia’s involvement in the separation movement in Donbass and the downing of the civil aircraft MH17. The official aim of the sanctions was to make Russia comply with the Minsk ceasefire accord signed with Ukraine in February 2014. However, as the achievement of the initial goals – pressuring Russia to de-occupy Crimea and cease its involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine – have become unrealistic and seem to have become a fait accompli, the reasons for strengthening and continuing the sanctions regime have dramatically changed since 2014.
In fact, the sanctions are the apparent outcome of a longer underlying conflict between the West and Russia. There has been a series of misunderstandings and provocations from both sides that ultimately led to a huge loss of mutual confidence. Europe, particularly the EU’s Eastern and Baltic member states perceive Russia as the reborn Soviet Union and therefore as a threat to their security and sovereignty. On the other hand Russia feels itself mistreated and humiliated by the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A possible NATO and EU accession of its historical and cultuarlly close partner Ukraine would be a political desaster, humiliating, threatening the security and is therefore absolutely not negotiable. Russia can thus not be expected to give up Crimea, which has a specal role from a cultural due to the peninsula being mostly inhabited by Russian speakers and having historically been a part of the Russian Soviet Republic and security perspective, as it hosts the base of the Russian black sea fleet and enables to control the Asov sea in the straight of Kerch. The Anti-Russian Ukrainian government has therefore crossed the red line for Russia by considering NATO membership, causing it to intervene militarily.
Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union many ethnical Russians suddenly found themselves in new, often nationalistic states. The newly independent Ukraine often sympathized with the idea of EU membership and thus often tried to reduce Russian influence. In fact, the EU consistently fuelled the hope of nowadays completely unrealistic membership by granting money in turn for Ukraine fulfilling economic and legal conditions. With the election of Petro Poroshenko a radically nationalistic and anti-Russian stance was taken. Many measures of the new government directly aimed against the Russian speaking community. This in turn served as a pretext for the Russian government to put Crimea under it’s control and militarily and economically support the separation of Donezk and Lugansk.
Apart from the fact, that the incorporation of Crimea is not discussable for the reasons mentioned above, the sanctions have for several reasons missed their initial objectives. Apart from being expensive and therefore not popular within large parts of the population, sanctions in general and particularly those imposed by the EU in the aftermath of the Russian aggression towards Ukraine have fundamental flaws.
For instance, they
i. do not take account of human behaviour and responses
ii. can be circumvented by sanction busters such as China, India or South America
iii. can feel humiliating and stir nationalist and anti-EU sentiment
iv. are felt more by the people than the political elite
v. cause a serious divide within the EU, undermining the unity and playing in the hands of Anti-European forces
Since the sanctions are not meeting the expectations, the question arises if they have been designed to be successful at all. As analysts Nataliia Slobodian and Iryna Ptasnyk wrote:
“We cannot expect sanctions to lead to surrender. The relevant question is rather: are sanctions changing the context in which Russia’s decisions are being made? Would we have achieved the Minsk package, even with its weakness of implementation, without sanctions? Consider the alternative of the failure of transatlantic unity and no sanctions. What would President Putin have then concluded about the character and strength of the West?”
This means, that the sanctions allow the European leaders to keep face while keeping the costs relatively low. The sanctions had a very negative economic impact, causing approximately 400,000 jobs in the EU to be lost and a reduction in trade of 41 billion Euros in just two years. However, the most painful and for both sides extremely vital sector has not been affected by sanctions at all – the gas trade. Russia has made it clear from the beginning, that gas exports will not be affected and that the EU can rely on them. This is not only a bargaining chip of Russia against the EU, but also the Russian economy is to an extremely high degree dependent on gas exports, mostly to the EU. We can consequently conclude that the sanctions are not meant to inflict real strain on the Russian economy and government, but rather seem to be a compromise between playing the strongman and escalating the conflict and close the eyes for the sake of conserving business as usual.
Undoubtedly, the sanctions serve as a concession to a certain audience. In democratic Europe, especially in the East, a too soft stance against Russia would not have been popular, as leaders in Baltic countries and Poland fear Russian aggression towards their own countries and a spillover of the conflicts taking place in the post-Soviet space. The continued use of sanctions may help to limit future behavior through the increasing of perceived costs of aggression by Russia, while also providing a deliberate effort to delegitimize acts that violate international law. A balancing act between converging interests is therefore required.
Nevertheless, the actual situation is rather unsatisfactory, as the conflict in Ukraine has frozen and many urge for a closer cooperation with Russia for economic reasons and for preventing ongoing alienation and close the rift between the block and the Federation.
Since their adoption in 2014 the sanctions have been regularly extended without a clear strategy or assessment of whether they are effective. As Maarten Smeets proposes in the book “Russian Trade Policy: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects” the EU has several options.
(i) They can leave sanctions in place, in the expectation that their effect will grow over time, and because they want them to give a permanent political signal that annexing territory is unactable.
(ii) They can lift sanctions and return to business as usual, as practiced after Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008
(iii) They can maintain the objectives but adjust the sanctions.
(iv) They can maintain the sanctions but adjust the objectives.
(v) They can adjust both sanctions and objectives
Due to deep distrust between the current leaderships and EU expecting Russia to make steps in its direction, the sanctions will most likely stay in place for longer. A changing Russian behavior on the international foreign policy scene, an upwind in economic and cultural cooperation or changes in the leadership of both sides however bear the potential for a new rapprochement.
To conclude, it is undisputed, that imposing sanctions as a diplomacy tool has many flaws. However, they are a relatively harmless way of forceful persuasion and nevertheless have an impact on the decision making process. In case of changing political circumstances in Russia, Ukraine or the EU, the current sanctions can nevertheless be adjusted and cooperation again intensified.
